More of the same.
It has come
to my attention that “Salterism” is now being debated online, with, for
example, mixed-race HBD blogger “Jayman” criticizing Salter, while others,
including “n/a” of Race History Notes, have defended Salter’s EGI thesis. Here, I join in (again) with a defense of Salter's work.
Back in the
years 2003-2008 I spent considerable effort promoting and defending Salter’s
work, particularly in the journal American Renaissance and in the blog Majority
Rights. Virtually all the arguments now being (once again) asserted against EGI
had already been dissected, analyzed, and refuted back then. But like some sort of drug-resistant
infection, the mendacity brigade returns with the tired old arguments.
The whole
situation is somewhat bizarre. Given that population groups differ genetically,
and that individuals within such groups (at least when comparing relatively
distant groups) are always genetically more similar to others of the same ethny
than to aliens, and given the importance of the relative prevalence of
distinctive genes and of genetic continuity in measures of biological fitness,
technical criticisms of the fundamentals of EGI are sort of like questioning
whether the Earth revolves around the Sun. It is a strangely quixotic quest, it
is similar to King Canute ordering the tide not to come in. Even liberal "academic" Ingo Brigandt admits: "it is an evolutionarily better strategy to spend beneficial behavior towards fellow ethnics than towards outsiders, because you are more closely related to them." Which, is, of course, the main thesis of Salter's argument (more on Brigandt below).
The only real critique
possible is one of values – i.e., genetic interests are real, but, who
cares? However, I find the values
argument hypocritical and mendacious as well. Imagine two co-ethnics, Jim and
Mark. Jim highly values his genetic interests, genetic continuity, and racial
survival. Mark is indifferent to all of that, he “doesn’t care” about it. Very
well. But if Jim cares deeply and Mark not at all, then common sense and
fundamental ethics tell us that Mark, who asserts he doesn’t care one way or
the other, should let Jim have his way. Why not? If one believes Mark then he’s fine either
way – the race prospers or it does not. Mark’s indifference should then make
way for Jim’s deep concern and concentrated activism. Of course, Mark may be a
liar, he may have other interests which conflict with Jim’s concerns with race
and EGI; if so, Mark should be honest about these interests. If Jim and Mark
are of different ethnies, and if Mark opposes Jim’s pursuit of EGI, Jim should
be wary of Mark’s claims to be a disinterested commentator. Mark’s interests do not bestow upon him the
right to delegitimize Jim’s pursuit of his ultimate interests through the misuse
of pseudoscientific sophistry.
Getting back to the issue of values, it is indeed amusing when people who claim “they do not care” about race get so upset with scenarios in which Europeans survive and prosper. If race is “irrelevant” then it should be “irrelevant” if non-Europeans become extinct and an expanding European population colonizes the entire Earth. Why not? “Nothing matters.” Except of course, in reality, it all matters. Attacks against “Salterism” are not disinterested science, but hyper-interested ethnic activism and/or political ideology.
Getting back to the issue of values, it is indeed amusing when people who claim “they do not care” about race get so upset with scenarios in which Europeans survive and prosper. If race is “irrelevant” then it should be “irrelevant” if non-Europeans become extinct and an expanding European population colonizes the entire Earth. Why not? “Nothing matters.” Except of course, in reality, it all matters. Attacks against “Salterism” are not disinterested science, but hyper-interested ethnic activism and/or political ideology.
Further, the
existence and utility of EGI do not - repeat NOT - depend upon any of the following anti-White/HBD/GNXP/Desi
obsessions: evolution of altruism, alleles for altruism, evolution of ethnic
nepotism, green beard effect, etc.
Individuals making such arguments either have not read Salter’s work and
are responding to what they assume is there, or, if they have read the work, are
too stupid or self-interested to understand and/or truthfully report what the
content actually is.
The concept
of EGI, while on one level complex and subtle is, on another level, simple and
powerful. In a relative sense, individuals
are more closely related (share more distinctive genetic information) with
co-ethnics than with non-ethnics (this is a biological reality that cannot be
refuted); therefore, those individuals' biological fitness is reduced by the
replacement/diminishment of that co-ethnic genetic information by that of
non-ethnics, with the extent of the reduction being directly related to the
numbers involved. The “evolution of behavior X” has nothing to do with it,
absolutely nothing. The past histories of groups are also irrelevant; the point
is: what are the genetic “facts on the ground” today, and what behavior,
including and especially rational thought mechanisms and not “instinct,” will
best preserve current and future biological fitness? The only thing that was required to “evolve”
is rational thought (such evolution may not have occurred for Salter’s
critics).
Thus, a
parent will suffer a loss of biological fitness if their biological children
are replaced by that of strangers (do the HBDers deny that a Cuckoo-parasitized
bird loses fitness?). That this loss has NOTHING to do with “the evolution of
parental care instincts” can be easily discerned by considering the case of a
man who does not know he has fathered a son.
If the son dies without reproducing, does the man suffer a loss of
fitness? Of course he does, regardless
of his awareness of the loss. The loss occurs simply by virtue of the change in
the relative representation of genetic information in the population, not due
to awareness of the loss, actions taken to prevent or promote the loss, or any "evolved behavior" that influences that loss (see Salter’s distinction between
genetic interests and inclusive fitness, and also consider that inclusive
fitness – which is influenced by
actions/behavior – can be actualized in humans by rational thought mechanisms;
it does not require any “evolved behaviors” or “altruism alleles” for its
execution). Thus – and this is key – “Salterism” is based upon rational thought mechanisms, not the mythical “alleles for altruism” (which, unlike EGI, is mere conjecture and not biological reality), or any “evolved behavior.”
Also,
criticisms in this direction are the height of hypocrisy – since the same types
who critique Salter for invoking “the naturalistic fallacy” or “appeal to
nature” are the same ones who deny the validity of pursuing EGI because they
assert that such behavior did not evolve in nature!
Salter also
spends time dealing with the “free-rider” problem, and the importance of
proofing against free-riders. It needs to be pointed out, however, that in an
age of mass migration, any putative short-term “benefit” from free-riding to
enhance personal/familial genetic interests at the cost of ethnic interests will be more
than wiped out by the massive losses of genetic interest at the ethnoracial level.
Concern
trolling about “free-riding” is also hypocritical, for it is always invoked for
intra-racial scenarios, but never for inter-racial ones, even though the costs of
inter-racial free-riding will be greater than for intra-racial, due to the
greater genetic differences of the actors involved. Further, even if one wants
to restrict free-riding concerns to the issue of “genes for altruism” the
inter-racial situation also is of greater import. Individuals from radically
different ethnies, population groups that have evolved under different
environmental pressures and cultural histories, are more likely to differ in
these putative “genes for altruism” than are co-ethnics. Therefore, when those
from ethnies (e.g., White Gentiles) with higher levels of universalist altruism
co-mingle with those from less universally altruistic ethnies (e.g., Desi
cognitive elitists, Jamaican HBD bloggers, or ethnocentric Jews), the latter
individuals will free-ride on the altruism, and on the collective social goods,
of the former individuals. This will reduce the prevalence of those
ever-so-important “alleles for altruism” in the population; a dastardly
scenario that could be avoided with some Salterian Universal Nationalism. For some mysterious reason, that sort of
free-riding problem is not discussed by critics of Salter.
Now, next I will reproduce some of old material on this subject, in edited form, and then there is not much else to say.
I can of course find and reproduce even more of my old material and engage in
endless debate, but the best person to make these arguments is Salter himself.
And, truth be told, the likely outcome is that in a few years another nitwit
will surface to make the same anti-EGI arguments all over again.
This is an edited excerpt from one of my old blogs; Ingo Brigandt is a liberal "academic" hostile to the EGI idea, but note his admission about an "evolutionarily better strategy":
Of interest to the GNXPers is
Brigandt’s confused article: “Brigandt, I.
(2001) “The homeopathy of kin selection: an evaluation of van den Berghe's
sociobiological approach to ethnicity.” Politics and the Life Sciences
20: 203–215.” There he attempts to explain
why ethnic nepotism is not adaptive. The
problem is that it boils down to Brigandt’s definition of a behavior being
adaptive if it evolved. He asserts that
ethnic nepotism could not have evolved because various population groups were
isolated from each other during their evolution; hence, there was no selective
pressure for ethnic nepotism. Therefore,
given that circumstance, ethnic nepotism could not have evolved; thus, it
cannot be adaptive.
Putting aside the argument of
whether ethnic nepotism could have evolved (*), the problem here is a semantic
one; that is, defining “adaptive.” If we
wish to define “adaptive” in the sense that Brigandt does, then he may be
correct, given that caveat of the footnote below. However, let’s look at this quote by Brigandt
from the same paper (Dawkins, Malloy, and all the “cake eaters,”take note):
“True enough, it is an evolutionarily better strategy to spend beneficial behavior towards fellow ethnics than towards outsiders, because you are more closely related to them.”
Well, yes. That, in one sentence, is a reasonable
summary of Salter’s *prescriptive* argument.
Indeed, herein lies the problem, in that Salter (and I) would define
adaptive as “an evolutionarily better strategy” - a strategy independent of whether or not it has evolved or not.
To add to the confusion, Brigandt
follows that sentence with:
“But this fact does not indicate that this kind of behavior will evolve (rather than egoism or other behavioral patterns) independent of cost/benefit considerations.”
First of all, this is somewhat contradictory, in that
cost/benefit considerations come to play in the “evolutionarily better
strategy,” so there really is no reason to a priori assume that the behavior is
taking place independent of such considerations. That’s absurd. Brigandt harps on that even
the “better strategy” may be “maladaptive” – confusing meanings of adaptive –
because of “cost/benefit” considerations.
Again – these considerations are part and parcel of the “better
strategy.” He keeps on talking about the
“evolution of altruistic behavior” which is NOT relevant to EGI (see above).
The edited
Majority Rights essay:
Frank
Salter has given us a new understanding of the relationships of individuals to
ethnies and ethnies to each other. But being the pursuit of the freedom
of the individual, liberalism must cast down and, in the end, destroy
ethnicity. Salter, therefore, is useful to those who would oppose this
outcome; in the hands of our people the notion of ethnic genetic interests
(EGI) would go a long way to awaken our ethny to itself and to its
circumstance. Liberalism cannot allow this and must, if it is to complete
its purpose of “freeing” Western Man, falsify Salter’s notion or, failing that,
render it morally illegitimate.
David B and GNXP have fallen in line with the attempt to falsify EGI. Therefore, both from the point of view of resisting this attempt and of disseminating the idea of EGI into public life, it is necessary to intrude once again - and at some length - upon the goodwill and intellectual appetite of MR’s readers.
Please note all references to Salter’s work are from his first edition of On Genetic Interests. I strongly advise you to pull up the appropriate pages and have them to hand on your screen while you peruse the following.
Part I:
Philosophy concerns
“quasi-philosophical issues.”
There is a
practical way of translating David’s disinterest in genetic continuity (e.g.,
not caring about the fate of one’s own children). If someone cares about
his children or his ethny (or nation, etc.), then this is a value not subject
to rational critique - unless the entity of attachment does not exist.
But, as we know, all these categories do have an objective existence. If
David wishes to maintain the nihilistic idea that “life has no interests” that
is his right and we will not be able to convince him otherwise. However,
those who believe that life indeed does have interests will find Salter’s
arguments more compelling than those of David.
As regards the nonsense that Salter is anti-eugenic, see below (response to Part II, points 3 and 5). In point of fact, looking at some of the arguments David makes, particularly in Part II (and to some extent, Part III) and looking also at his constant harping about eugenics, I am led to wonder if all of these ideas and arguments really originated with David himself. Ultimately though, other than in the important consideration of motivation, it matters not - because the arguments put forth by David, whatever their origin, fail to convince.
Part II:
Technical Comments is
revealing since the main answers to David’s comments are to be found in
Salter’s book itself. My main aim here is to demonstrate that fact to
third party readers, who should obtain that work for themselves and carefully
compare it to GNXP’s misrepresentations.
Point 1: If
it is not clear in Salter’s work, he is referring to distinctive gene
frequencies rather than distinctive genes per se. David’s assertion about
the relative non-importance of human genetic variation is an opinion, which
mirrors the “we are all the same” arguments of race-deniers. Salter deals
with this in section 4e of his book (pages 89-93). Given that genetic
information is arraigned in a hierarchical fashion, with small changes in
control genes and promoter/enhancer regions having significant downstream
effects on total gene expression and resultant phenotypes (on which selection
operates), the “differences are too small” argument falls flat.
Ironically, many of the non-political posts in GNXP’s own archives underline
the importance of human genetic variation and thus contradict David’s
assertions of the Universalist genetic identity of humanity. The idea
that we are all essentially clones of each other is undermined by new data that shows
variation between individuals (the Nature Genetics paper described below
concentrates on groups, btw). The “we are 99.9% the same” commentaries
may soon become undermined by reality. Does David deny that individuals
belonging to the same population group have more common/recent ancestors than
persons belonging to different groups and thus share more distinctive gene
frequencies?
Of interest
as well as Salter’s point (page 91) that the politically-correct minimization
of human genetic variation is an inversion of scientific reasoning, in that it
attempts to obscure rather than “explain and predict facts” such as gene-caused
phenotypic differences between population groups. If human biodiversity
results from that genetic variation which David says is so small, then this
stresses rather than diminishes the importance of these small
differences. In addition, genetic interests are relative and even
siblings - whose genetic differences are small compared to those that
characterize population groups - have differences in interests (“sibling
rivalry”). Furthermore, genetic interests are the product of the extent
of relative genetic variation multiplied by the numbers of people involved. The
genetic interest inherent in ethnies is very large because of population size.
I am gratified
to see that David B mentions combinations of genes in his critique, for that
is, in my opinion, the only real flaw in Salter’s work - that Dr. Salter does
not consider patterns/combinations of gene frequencies as a genetic interest,
even though such patterns are in fact a genetic
interest. What this does, of course, is increase the importance of
genetic interests, and adds to the refutation of David’s critique.
Point 2: With respect to the broad scope of genetic interests, this section by David is essentially nit-picking as well as a repetition of his previous argument. Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing in detail to clarify some of Salter’s points.
First,
Salter’s comment (page 326) about “...ever more complete genetic maps” suggests
he realizes that more genetic data is needed (also see page 54 and page
265). It may also be noted that (neutral) gene assays are based upon the
statistical method of sampling; these assays are used by Salter to provide
estimates of the probability of persons sharing the same distinctive functional
alleles that Salter is primarily concerned with. Regardless how genetic
variation is assayed, David will ultimately be disappointed that his “we are
all the same” mantra is not supported.
For
example, Nature Genetics 5, 598-609, 2004 asked, “What proportion of SNPs and
haplotypes are shared among groups if alleles are ascertained in an unbiased
fashion?” African-Americans and European-Americans were compared.
The conclusion: “...most of the common SNPs in this data set are either private
or common in only a single population.” Haplotype analysis gave similar
results. More to the point, even many of those SNPs common to both groups
had markedly different frequencies (i.e., their frequencies were population
distinctive). And these were derived from functional DNA sequences,
relevant because Salter stresses functional genes in his work. However,
the functional/non-functional divide doesn’t really alter anything, since this
paper also states that “...ancestry inferences are robust using a modest number
of polymorphisms in either coding or non-coding regions.”
Second,
since Salter is indeed concerned with functional genes (see point 4), it does
make sense to examine gene/allele frequency. David’s complaint about
“function and fitness” is somewhat contradictory since he then suggests that
total genomic similarity be considered, which is not really concerned with
“function and fitness”.
Third, the
main body of point 2 is essentially just a restatement of point 1, and can be
answered the same as above for point 1.
Fourth, the
argument against the importance of general “genetic similarity” is even more
fundamental. Just as natural selection is dependent upon genetic variation and
works upon genetic differences, by analogy, so do relative differences in
genetic interests depend on distinctive gene frequencies. Thus, genetic
interests are not concerned with absolute levels of genetic similarity. Mice
share ~ 90% of their gene sequences with humans, but this does not mean that
two (or more) mice constitute a greater genetic interest for you than does one
other single human.
Salter
clearly states in his book (page 95) that it is only distinctive genes
[frequencies] that are important (not total genetic similarity).
Harpending also makes this point in his onion analogy in the Appendix (page
327). Genetic variation that is randomly distributed among populations
does not constitute ethnic genetic interest because the gene (and gene
sequence) frequencies remain the same regardless of the outcome of ethnic
competition.
Thus, it is not overall genetic similarity that is the point per se, but distinctive genetic information, in a relative sense. Salter (page 47) illustrates the relative nature of genetic interests with his “a world made up of cousins” analogy.
Thus, it is not overall genetic similarity that is the point per se, but distinctive genetic information, in a relative sense. Salter (page 47) illustrates the relative nature of genetic interests with his “a world made up of cousins” analogy.
The bulk of human genetic variation is within populations, randomly distributed among the groups; in fact, as Sarich and Miele state in their book “Race”, because humans are diploid a significant fraction of human genetic variation is found within each individual person.
Genetic information that does not differ in frequency between groups is not the stuff upon which inter-group competition and genetic interests are built. For most but not all (!) of the human genome it would not matter if all humans except for Bushmen were killed, because the genetic variation in Bushmen is at least as great as that of any other human population and composes the bulk of total human genetic variation. However, for those distinctive gene sequences, for which there is considerable inter-group variability, much would indeed be lost if specific populations are diminished or eliminated. Members of groups thus have interests (ethnic genetic interests) in the frequencies of those distinctive genes/gene sequences, which is what in fact distinguishes one human group from another at the genetic level. Furthermore, those gene frequencies that result in the phenotypic differences between population groups are concentrated in the genetic variation between groups. Therefore, not only is this lesser level of variation more valuable because of its uniqueness and distinctiveness but also because of its functional information.
This is why
it is not important that an Irishman may theoretically share more similarity in
his overall genome to a Nigerian than to another Irishman, for that similarity
is based upon randomly distributed genetic variation that, because it is
ubiquitous, has no value as a genetic interest. However, the Irishman in
question will in fact share more similarity with another Irishman than with a
Nigerian for that genetic information that is not randomly distributed, but distinctive.
This is
also why it would be more adaptive for an Irishman to support his fellow
Irishman in competition with a Nigerian who may be more similar to the Irishman
in the entire genome. The bulk of the similarity between the Irishman and
the Nigerian is based upon gene sequences randomly distributed among all humans
and thus this similarity does not constitute meaningful information in
distinguishing intra-human genetic interests; e.g., between those of Irishmen
and Nigerians.
If all
Nigerians became extinct, this would not change the worldwide frequencies of
this randomly distributed genetic information. It will still be found in
similar proportions in all other populations, and thus the Irishman would lose
no genetic interest. However, if all Irishmen except for our Irish person
of interest became extinct, then there would be a diminishment in unique and
distinctive genetic information, and therefore a significant loss of genetic
interest for our subject. An incorrect emphasis on absolute numbers of
similar gene sequences, rather on the relative nature of distinctive genetic
information, would result in the absurd conclusion that a person has a greater
genetic interest in a vegetable garden (or any other organic mass containing a
large number of similar [potentially] replicating gene sequences) than in their
own child. Selection, competition, and conflicting biological interests
are based upon distinctions in genetic information, not upon randomly
distributed genetic similarity, genetic information that retains the same
representation in the population regardless of outcome. (See also Salter’s
book, pages 45-48, 95, and 327-333).
OK, on to
points 3 and 5. Here we observe a serious problem in which Salter’s views
are being grossly misrepresented, and clearly written statements in his book
are being completely ignored. Salter’s views are not “anti-eugenic”, and
the Huntington’s example is vulgar and absurd. Salter openly and clearly
states (Section 4d, page 89) that it would be adaptive, in a net sense for the
entire distinctive genome, for maladaptive alleles to be sacrificed. Salter
also makes a similar point about possible adaptive changes in genetic structure
in section 4g, page 109, in which he states that specific positive genetic
characteristics could be spread throughout a population via “inter-marriage or
reproductive technologies”. Salter also makes the point in his ethics
section (page 319) that genetic competition must be allowed to continue, but
within limits - total displacement, or severe diminishment, of ethnies is to be
avoided. Salter approvingly discusses Hamilton’s point that “social systems
must leave room for adaptive genetic replacement”. However, Salter
stresses, again, that ethnic displacement is wrong, and that adaptive changes
in gene frequencies can take place without such displacement. Indeed, for
most of human history, selective pressures have been acting on isolated, relatively
homogenous populations. Eugenics can be practiced within the ethny, and,
yes, without the “intermarriage” that Salter mentions, and it is completely
compatible with a strong commitment to ethnic genetic interests.
Eugenic
modulation within the ethny is best, since it preserves kinship genetic
interests while boosting adaptive genetic interests. Intermarriage
between widely separated groups would destroy genetic interest to a far greater
extent than any putative increase in a positively valued trait, as my IQ
example illustrates.
In summary,
I see points 3 and 5 as gross distortions of Salter’s openly stated views.
Essentially David lifts from Salter’s book the possible objections, but
neglects to give Salter’s answers. These distortions are a plain warning
sign to third parties NOT to depend on GNXP for honest analyses of Salterism.
With regard
to point 4 please see my answers to 3 and 5 above. Also, please bear in
mind that this criticism is again a gross distortion of Salter, who makes clear
again and again that he is talking about functional genes: e.g., he mentions
the importance of this on pages 87-88; on page 88 he clearly states that he has
relegated non-functional DNA sequences to “non-interest status”.
Actually
the distinction between functional and non-functional genes is, I think, going
to be worn down over time, given increasing evidence that “non-functional”
genes actually do have regulatory functions. Furthermore, I argue that
even some real non-functional genes constitute part of genetic interests,
because they can embody distinctive genetic information. Functional genes
may constitute both kinship genetic interests and adaptive genetic interests,
while non-functional genes may constitute kinship genetic interests only.
On a per codon basis, the functional genes are of course, a greater interest
but the non-functional genes are an interest as well. While Deutsch, like
Salter, stresses the importance of functional genes, he admits (pages 173-174
in “Fabric of Reality”) that this is a matter of degree. The information
of functional genes fills their “niche” better than non-functional genes, since
the functional genes actively contribute to their own replication. But,
non-functional genes carry information as well, even if it is of lesser
value. For example, I suggest that DNA sequences relevant to kinship (e.g.,
ancestral markers) are a form of information and if information is fundamental
to reality (with genetic information being fundamental to life), then it has
value.
My assertion
that true non-functional genes can constitute genetic interest does not obviate
the points made in response to point 2 regarding Salter’s stress on functional
genes in his analysis of genetic interest. The key here is information -
distinctive genetic information. Deutsch stresses that genes embody knowledge; e.g.,
he states that life “is about the physical embodiment of knowledge” (page 181
of Fabric of Reality).
Functional genes (including so-called “non-functional” genes that have real
regulatory roles) embody knowledge of their niches and contribute to their own
replication in a real way. Certain true non-functional genes embody
knowledge of kinship between living organisms, and these distinctive
non-functional gene markers can be considered analogous to the gene alleles discussed in point
2.
I cannot
ignore the fact that that a portion of the non-functional genome that is
distinctive contains information. I see information as being
fundamental. After all, there is a choice - there can be non-functional
sequences “A” or non-functional sequences “B”. Those that are randomly
shared between all groups are not interests between humans, since they give no
information. Those ancestral markers that distinguish ethnies represent
information, and thus, I argue, represent interest (since there is competition
for which of these distinctive gene sequences will be represented in
the next generation).
Do please
note that these thoughts on the importance of (true) non-functional genes are
my own. Salter - contrary to David’s implication - focuses on functional
genes. Furthermore, the historical development of the gene frequency
differences that Salter is concerned with is not relevant to current
consideration of genetic interests. The main question with respect to
genetic interest is “what”, not “why.” Thus, whether selection or drift
(or any other mechanism) is responsible for observed gene frequencies does not
change the interests in question.
As a side
note, I’d suggest that in any future update of “On Genetic Interests” Dr.
Salter should not only
clarify these points further, but should also add sections on:
-
Genetic patterns/combinations as genetic interests
-
Compare and contrast kinship genetic interests and adaptive
genetic interests
-
Intrinsic value of genetic information; compare and contrast
roles of functional and non-functional genes
-
Do dominant alleles have greater influence (positive or negative)
on genetic interests than do recessive alleles?
-
Discussion on how ethnic and meta-ethnic identities can boost
adaptive behavior with respect to genetic interests even in light of potential
kinship overlap between closely related groups
Part III:
Intermarriage Fallacy David
presents a two-group (English-Bantu) population model to demonstrate that the
proportions of distinctive genes remain the same after intermarriage. He
also asserts that the loss of kinship on one side of the intermarriage divide
is counterbalanced by an equal loss on the other side; given the relative
nature of genetic interests, intermarriage would thus result in no loss of
genetic interest. Discuss.
Putting
aside for the moment questions about patterns of gene frequencies (below),
David’s analysis does not take into proper consideration the following two
essential factors:
1) The
fixed carrying capacity of each nation (an integral part of Salter’s thesis
discussed, for example, on pages 61-63 of his book), and
2) The
effects of unidirectional migration.
So, for #1
we can talk about the number of “English gene equivalents” in an English
population at any given time. However, England has a fixed carrying
capacity. Let us say for example it is 150 million. Whether those
150 million are of pure English stock or of mixed English-Bantu stock makes an
enormous difference to the genetic interests of the current English population
and to each individual Englishman. Population cannot increase
infinitely. If the 150 million people are “pure” English (and of course
diploid), then that’s 300 million sets of “English” genes (300M/2 =
150M). If the 150 million are English-Bantu hybrids, then there are 150M
“English” genes and 150M “Bantu” genes. If we say that the carrying
capacity is 300 million, or 1 billion, or any number short of infinity, the
same holds.
As regards
#2 there is one-way gene flow from non-white nations to England. So, it
is NOT the case that a miscegenating Englishman is boosting his fitness by
“preventing” the births of pure Bantus in a reciprocal fashion. In
Africa, pure Bantus are still being born without the threat of immigration and
genetic dilution, and these will fill the carrying capacity of their territory
in sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, there is unidirectional migration of
Africans to the UK, where they dilute the genetic interests of the native
English ethny. Intermarriage in the UK may prevent the birth of pure
Bantus in the UK, but the
presence of Bantus in the UK represents an excess of Bantu genetic interests
above and beyond the store of undiluted genetic interests in their
homeland. In other words - and this is crucial - intermarriage in the UK
represents a positive net expansion of Bantu genes. They are not being
prevented from producing pure Bantus - they have every opportunity to pursue a
national ethnic strategy in Africa. The people who are really being
prevented from producing “pure offspring” are the English, for it is their
territory that is being invaded.
Since the
flow of people (and genes) is not reciprocal, then the effects of intermarriage
are not reciprocal. It is the native ethny of the mixed state who are being
prevented from maintaining their representation of the world-wide
population. The alien ethny both maintains their representation in their
homelands and expands their genes in someone else’s territory.
Ultimately, the Bantu genes are, on a world-wide basis, expanding, while those
of the English are declining. How on earth is there any reciprocity in
that?
As regards
the interests of an individual Englishman, the same holds. By intermarriage,
he loses parental kinship compared to endogamy, and he also loses relative
genetic interest not only compared to endogamous co-ethnics and non-ethnics but
also to exogamous non-ethnics, because of the asymmetrical nature of gene flow
as described above.
Let us use
another simple model of population and immigration to summarize these points.
Take two populations A and B who live in their respective nations AX and
BX. Let us assume that AX and BX both have a carrying capacity of “12
genetic-population units”. We start with the condition that AX has 4 A
units and BX has 8 B units. Two B units migrate from BX to AX; typical
unidirectional migration. Both nations now have 6 population units; BX is
“pure” 6 B, while AX is 4A and 2 B. Let us assume no further immigration,
and that in AX both ethnies have ~ equal growth rates (a very conservative
assumption). Both nations then reach carrying capacity. BX will
have 12 B units. Given proportional growth, AX will have 8 A and 4 B
units.
Obviously,
this unidirectional migration has harmed A’s interests, in that they have
suffered a decline in their population compared to what it would have been
(12A) without the migration of B. The worldwide genetic representation of
A has been diminished, while B has benefited by increasing its genetic
representation over and beyond the capacity of BX alone, from 12B to 16B.
According to classical Salterism, the damage to A will be the same, in a strictly genetic basis, regardless of whether the two groups in AX had remained endogamous after the B migration event, or whether there was intermarriage. The same number of individual “genetic units” from each group would be present. However:
1) An
interest in patterns/combinations of genes and gene frequencies yields a gross
decrease in fitness comparing exogamy over endogamy. On a worldwide
basis, A suffers more than B, because B is still present in undiluted form in
BX.
2) Even
given classical Salterism, exogamy hurts A’s interests by decreasing the
organic solidarity of the A group. Imagine that endogamy was
maintained. Group A could rally around a historical A identity and pursue
group interests vs. B. They could promote repatriation of B, separation,
or some other political-social movement to attempt to restore/maximize A’s
interests over that of the B newcomers. They could attempt to out-breed (e.g.,
going against the assumption above), maximizing A gene frequencies.
But once
admixture occurs, a heavily hybridized population cannot extricate A interests
away from that of B. Families would be mixed, genomes would be mixed, and
whatever pure A’s remain would have a limited potential to recruit sufficient
numbers of other pure A’s to their side in the struggle against B
interests. Some pure A’s would have admixed family members, etc.
Given sufficient intermarriage, the interests of the two groups would become so
intertwined that it would be impossible for the original interests of group A
to be pursued.
Thus, even
with classical Salterian theory, endogamy is to be preferred because it allows
the native ethny to strategize on a group-centered basis to salvage genetic
interests. Group B, secure in their original homeland, can afford to dilute A’s
interests and group solidarity via intermarriage. The effects - genetic
and socio-political - of intermarriage are not reciprocal because the migration
is not reciprocal. This holds regardless of whether the migration was
voluntary (immigration) or involuntary (slave trade).
David B is
also a bit inconsistent about all of this. Salter considers intermarriage
from both the familial and ethnic dimension. If we focus on the family,
it is clear that endogamy is superior, in that it boosts relative parental
kinship. But ah! … We are told by David that we must also consider the
effects of mate choice on others. Very well. Why stop at the “spare
English woman” or the local Bantu immigrant “prevented” from producing pure
Bantu offspring? If we need to consider the effects on others, in the
context of ethnic genetic interests, then we need to
consider effects on the entire
ethnies, no? And given realities of unidirectional immigration, the
effects on others of intermarriage is always to lower the fitness of the net
receiving ethny and to boost that of the net “contributing” immigrant ethny.
You can’t
have it both ways, indeed! If you wish to consider “effects on others”
you cannot arbitrarily stop the analysis at the point that is convenient for
your argument. You must consider the proportional representation of
ethnic genes and gene frequencies both within the entire nation and within the
world-wide human population, and you must consider the time dimension as
well – “effects on others” include future generations (who will be faced
with a maxed-out carrying capacity) as well as the current one. After
all, consideration of the genetic relationship between generations is what the
intermarriage/genetic interests idea is all about.
To
summarize the classical Salterian view:-
Regardless
of intermarriage, the mere
presence of alien peoples (e.g.,
immigrants and their descendants) harms the genetic interests of every member
of the native ethny. If some natives out-marry with the aliens, they also
suffer a loss of parental kinship with their offspring relative to what they would have obtained with
endogamy and they also lose genetic interest relative to those co-ethnics who do not
out-marry. Alien ethnics who out-marry, of course, also lose relative
genetic interest compared to their endogamous co-ethnics. However, even
the out-marrying alien ethnics gain a genetic advantage over all of the native
ethnics, because of the asymmetrical nature of unidirectional immigration
flow. Even though they lose relative genetic interest compared to
endogamous alien co-ethnics, they “help” displace native genes and gene
frequencies while their own homelands maintain a reservoir of undiluted ethnic
interests.
Thus, for
the native ethnics, “diversity” is always a net loss of genetic interests, with
exogamous natives losing more than endogamous ones. For the aliens, it is
a net gain as they are expanding their genes and gene frequencies into someone
else’s territory (assuming that the flow is not reciprocal, which it never
is). Out-marrying aliens gain less than endogamous aliens, but all gain
relative to
the natives.
The end
result of all of these demographic shifts is a net loss of native genes and
gene frequencies and a net gain for the aliens. Out-marrying also
constitutes a dilution of the genetic interests that every member of an ethny has
in the other. This not only decreases co-ethnic genetic interest (one can
consider out-marriage as decreasing the genetic interests of other co-ethnics)
but it undermines the organic solidarity of the group, making the pursuit of
group interests less feasible. Thus, the ability of the group to compete
is decreased relative to other groups. People who out-marry genetically
distant others can be viewed as “free riders” on their group’s
continuity. They benefit from the existence of their group, but “contribute”
negatively to it. All this undermines the group’s position in global
competition.
But
classical Salterian theory is limited. Of course, there is a real Salterian “fallacy” - but one
that underestimates, not
overestimates, the genetic loss via intermarriage and that undercuts the
critique analyzed here. Thus, patterns of gene frequencies is a piece of
information destroyed by intermarriage independent of the number of specific
alleles in the general population.