More Defense of Salterism

More of the same.

It has come to my attention that “Salterism” is now being debated online, with, for example, mixed-race HBD blogger “Jayman” criticizing Salter, while others, including “n/a” of Race History Notes, have defended Salter’s EGI thesis. Here, I join in (again) with a defense of Salter's work.

Back in the years 2003-2008 I spent considerable effort promoting and defending Salter’s work, particularly in the journal American Renaissance and in the blog Majority Rights. Virtually all the arguments now being (once again) asserted against EGI had already been dissected, analyzed, and refuted back then.  But like some sort of drug-resistant infection, the mendacity brigade returns with the tired old arguments.

The whole situation is somewhat bizarre. Given that population groups differ genetically, and that individuals within such groups (at least when comparing relatively distant groups) are always genetically more similar to others of the same ethny than to aliens, and given the importance of the relative prevalence of distinctive genes and of genetic continuity in measures of biological fitness, technical criticisms of the fundamentals of EGI are sort of like questioning whether the Earth revolves around the Sun. It is a strangely quixotic quest, it is similar to King Canute ordering the tide not to come in. Even liberal "academic" Ingo Brigandt admits: "it is an evolutionarily better strategy to spend beneficial behavior towards fellow ethnics than towards outsiders, because you are more closely related to them." Which, is, of course, the main thesis of Salter's argument (more on Brigandt below).

The only real critique possible is one of values – i.e., genetic interests are real, but, who cares?  However, I find the values argument hypocritical and mendacious as well. Imagine two co-ethnics, Jim and Mark. Jim highly values his genetic interests, genetic continuity, and racial survival. Mark is indifferent to all of that, he “doesn’t care” about it. Very well. But if Jim cares deeply and Mark not at all, then common sense and fundamental ethics tell us that Mark, who asserts he doesn’t care one way or the other, should let Jim have his way. Why not?  If one believes Mark then he’s fine either way – the race prospers or it does not. Mark’s indifference should then make way for Jim’s deep concern and concentrated activism. Of course, Mark may be a liar, he may have other interests which conflict with Jim’s concerns with race and EGI; if so, Mark should be honest about these interests. If Jim and Mark are of different ethnies, and if Mark opposes Jim’s pursuit of EGI, Jim should be wary of Mark’s claims to be a disinterested commentator.  Mark’s interests do not bestow upon him the right to delegitimize Jim’s pursuit of his ultimate interests through the misuse of pseudoscientific sophistry.  

Getting back to the issue of values, it is indeed amusing when people who claim “they do not care” about race get so upset with scenarios in which Europeans survive and prosper. If race is “irrelevant” then it should be “irrelevant” if non-Europeans become extinct and an expanding European population colonizes the entire Earth. Why not?  “Nothing matters.”  Except of course, in reality, it all matters. Attacks against “Salterism” are not disinterested science, but hyper-interested ethnic activism and/or political ideology.

Further, the existence and utility of EGI do not - repeat NOT - depend upon any of the following anti-White/HBD/GNXP/Desi obsessions: evolution of altruism, alleles for altruism, evolution of ethnic nepotism, green beard effect, etc.  Individuals making such arguments either have not read Salter’s work and are responding to what they assume is there, or, if they have read the work, are too stupid or self-interested to understand and/or truthfully report what the content actually is.

The concept of EGI, while on one level complex and subtle is, on another level, simple and powerful.  In a relative sense, individuals are more closely related (share more distinctive genetic information) with co-ethnics than with non-ethnics (this is a biological reality that cannot be refuted); therefore, those individuals' biological fitness is reduced by the replacement/diminishment of that co-ethnic genetic information by that of non-ethnics, with the extent of the reduction being directly related to the numbers involved. The “evolution of behavior X” has nothing to do with it, absolutely nothing. The past histories of groups are also irrelevant; the point is: what are the genetic “facts on the ground” today, and what behavior, including and especially rational thought mechanisms and not “instinct,” will best preserve current and future biological fitness? The only thing that was required to “evolve” is rational thought (such evolution may not have occurred for Salter’s critics).

Thus, a parent will suffer a loss of biological fitness if their biological children are replaced by that of strangers (do the HBDers deny that a Cuckoo-parasitized bird loses fitness?). That this loss has NOTHING to do with “the evolution of parental care instincts” can be easily discerned by considering the case of a man who does not know he has fathered a son.  If the son dies without reproducing, does the man suffer a loss of fitness?  Of course he does, regardless of his awareness of the loss. The loss occurs simply by virtue of the change in the relative representation of genetic information in the population, not due to awareness of the loss, actions taken to prevent or promote the loss, or any "evolved behavior" that influences that loss (see Salter’s distinction between genetic interests and inclusive fitness, and also consider that inclusive fitness – which is influenced by actions/behavior – can be actualized in humans by rational thought mechanisms; it does not require any “evolved behaviors” or “altruism alleles” for its execution).  Thus – and this is key – “Salterism” is based upon rational thought mechanisms, not the mythical “alleles for altruism” (which, unlike EGI, is mere conjecture and not biological reality), or any “evolved behavior.”

Also, criticisms in this direction are the height of hypocrisy – since the same types who critique Salter for invoking “the naturalistic fallacy” or “appeal to nature” are the same ones who deny the validity of pursuing EGI because they assert that such behavior did not evolve in nature!

Salter also spends time dealing with the “free-rider” problem, and the importance of proofing against free-riders. It needs to be pointed out, however, that in an age of mass migration, any putative short-term “benefit” from free-riding to enhance personal/familial genetic interests at the cost of ethnic interests will be more than wiped out by the massive losses of genetic interest at the ethnoracial level. 

Concern trolling about “free-riding” is also hypocritical, for it is always invoked for intra-racial scenarios, but never for inter-racial ones, even though the costs of inter-racial free-riding will be greater than for intra-racial, due to the greater genetic differences of the actors involved. Further, even if one wants to restrict free-riding concerns to the issue of “genes for altruism” the inter-racial situation also is of greater import. Individuals from radically different ethnies, population groups that have evolved under different environmental pressures and cultural histories, are more likely to differ in these putative “genes for altruism” than are co-ethnics. Therefore, when those from ethnies (e.g., White Gentiles) with higher levels of universalist altruism co-mingle with those from less universally altruistic ethnies (e.g., Desi cognitive elitists, Jamaican HBD bloggers, or ethnocentric Jews), the latter individuals will free-ride on the altruism, and on the collective social goods, of the former individuals. This will reduce the prevalence of those ever-so-important “alleles for altruism” in the population; a dastardly scenario that could be avoided with some Salterian Universal Nationalism.  For some mysterious reason, that sort of free-riding problem is not discussed by critics of Salter.

Now, next I will reproduce some of old material on this subject, in edited form, and then there is not much else to say. I can of course find and reproduce even more of my old material and engage in endless debate, but the best person to make these arguments is Salter himself. And, truth be told, the likely outcome is that in a few years another nitwit will surface to make the same anti-EGI arguments all over again.

This is an edited excerpt from one of my old blogs; Ingo Brigandt is a liberal "academic" hostile to the EGI idea, but note his admission about an "evolutionarily better strategy":

Of interest to the GNXPers is Brigandt’s confused article: “Brigandt, I. (2001) “The homeopathy of kin selection: an evaluation of van den Berghe's sociobiological approach to ethnicity.” Politics and the Life Sciences 20: 203–215.”  There he attempts to explain why ethnic nepotism is not adaptive.  The problem is that it boils down to Brigandt’s definition of a behavior being adaptive if it evolved.  He asserts that ethnic nepotism could not have evolved because various population groups were isolated from each other during their evolution; hence, there was no selective pressure for ethnic nepotism.  Therefore, given that circumstance, ethnic nepotism could not have evolved; thus, it cannot be adaptive.

Putting aside the argument of whether ethnic nepotism could have evolved (*), the problem here is a semantic one; that is, defining “adaptive.”  If we wish to define “adaptive” in the sense that Brigandt does, then he may be correct, given that caveat of the footnote below.  However, let’s look at this quote by Brigandt from the same paper (Dawkins, Malloy, and all the “cake eaters,”take note):

“True enough, it is an evolutionarily better strategy to spend beneficial behavior towards fellow ethnics than towards outsiders, because you are more closely related to them.”

Well, yes.  That, in one sentence, is a reasonable summary of Salter’s *prescriptive* argument.  Indeed, herein lies the problem, in that Salter (and I) would define adaptive as “an evolutionarily better strategy” -  a strategy independent of whether or not it has evolved or not.

To add to the confusion, Brigandt follows that sentence with:

“But this fact does not indicate that this kind of behavior will evolve (rather than egoism or other behavioral patterns) independent of cost/benefit considerations.”

First of all, this is somewhat contradictory, in that cost/benefit considerations come to play in the “evolutionarily better strategy,” so there really is no reason to a priori assume that the behavior is taking place independent of such considerations.  That’s absurd. Brigandt harps on that even the “better strategy” may be “maladaptive” – confusing meanings of adaptive – because of “cost/benefit” considerations.  Again – these considerations are part and parcel of the “better strategy.”  He keeps on talking about the “evolution of altruistic behavior” which is NOT relevant to EGI (see above).  

The edited Majority Rights essay:

Frank Salter has given us a new understanding of the relationships of individuals to ethnies and ethnies to each other.  But being the pursuit of the freedom of the individual, liberalism must cast down and, in the end, destroy ethnicity.  Salter, therefore, is useful to those who would oppose this outcome; in the hands of our people the notion of ethnic genetic interests (EGI) would go a long way to awaken our ethny to itself and to its circumstance.  Liberalism cannot allow this and must, if it is to complete its purpose of “freeing” Western Man, falsify Salter’s notion or, failing that, render it morally illegitimate.

David B and GNXP have fallen in line with the attempt to falsify EGI.  Therefore, both from the point of view of resisting this attempt and of disseminating the idea of EGI into public life, it is necessary to intrude once again - and at some length - upon the goodwill and intellectual appetite of MR’s readers.

Please note all references to Salter’s work are from his first edition of On Genetic Interests.  I strongly advise you to pull up the appropriate pages and have them to hand on your screen while you peruse the following.

Part I: Philosophy concerns “quasi-philosophical issues.”

There is a practical way of translating David’s disinterest in genetic continuity (e.g., not caring about the fate of one’s own children).  If someone cares about his children or his ethny (or nation, etc.), then this is a value not subject to rational critique - unless the entity of attachment does not exist.  But, as we know, all these categories do have an objective existence.  If David wishes to maintain the nihilistic idea that “life has no interests” that is his right and we will not be able to convince him otherwise.  However, those who believe that life indeed does have interests will find Salter’s arguments more compelling than those of David.

As regards the nonsense that Salter is anti-eugenic, see below (response to Part II, points 3 and 5).  In point of fact, looking at some of the arguments David makes, particularly in Part II (and to some extent, Part III) and looking also at his constant harping about eugenics, I am led to wonder if all of these ideas and arguments really originated with David himself.  Ultimately though, other than in the important consideration of motivation, it matters not - because the arguments put forth by David, whatever their origin, fail to convince.

Part II: Technical Comments is revealing since the main answers to David’s comments are to be found in Salter’s book itself.  My main aim here is to demonstrate that fact to third party readers, who should obtain that work for themselves and carefully compare it to GNXP’s misrepresentations.

Point 1: If it is not clear in Salter’s work, he is referring to distinctive gene frequencies rather than distinctive genes per se.  David’s assertion about the relative non-importance of human genetic variation is an opinion, which mirrors the “we are all the same” arguments of race-deniers.  Salter deals with this in section 4e of his book (pages 89-93).  Given that genetic information is arraigned in a hierarchical fashion, with small changes in control genes and promoter/enhancer regions having significant downstream effects on total gene expression and resultant phenotypes (on which selection operates), the “differences are too small” argument falls flat.  Ironically, many of the non-political posts in GNXP’s own archives underline the importance of human genetic variation and thus contradict David’s assertions of the Universalist genetic identity of humanity.  The idea that we are all essentially clones of each other is undermined by new data that shows variation between individuals (the Nature Genetics paper described below concentrates on groups, btw).  The “we are 99.9% the same” commentaries may soon become undermined by reality.  Does David deny that individuals belonging to the same population group have more common/recent ancestors than persons belonging to different groups and thus share more distinctive gene frequencies?

Of interest as well as Salter’s point (page 91) that the politically-correct minimization of human genetic variation is an inversion of scientific reasoning, in that it attempts to obscure rather than “explain and predict facts” such as gene-caused phenotypic differences between population groups.  If human biodiversity results from that genetic variation which David says is so small, then this stresses rather than diminishes the importance of these small differences.  In addition, genetic interests are relative and even siblings - whose genetic differences are small compared to those that characterize population groups - have differences in interests (“sibling rivalry”).  Furthermore, genetic interests are the product of the extent of relative genetic variation multiplied by the numbers of people involved. The genetic interest inherent in ethnies is very large because of population size.

I am gratified to see that David B mentions combinations of genes in his critique, for that is, in my opinion, the only real flaw in Salter’s work - that Dr. Salter does not consider patterns/combinations of gene frequencies as a genetic interest, even though such patterns are in fact a genetic interest.  What this does, of course, is increase the importance of genetic interests, and adds to the refutation of David’s critique.

Point 2: With respect to the broad scope of genetic interests, this section by David is essentially nit-picking as well as a repetition of his previous argument.  Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing in detail to clarify some of Salter’s points.

First, Salter’s comment (page 326) about “...ever more complete genetic maps” suggests he realizes that more genetic data is needed (also see page 54 and page 265).  It may also be noted that (neutral) gene assays are based upon the statistical method of sampling; these assays are used by Salter to provide estimates of the probability of persons sharing the same distinctive functional alleles that Salter is primarily concerned with.  Regardless how genetic variation is assayed, David will ultimately be disappointed that his “we are all the same” mantra is not supported.

For example, Nature Genetics 5, 598-609, 2004 asked, “What proportion of SNPs and haplotypes are shared among groups if alleles are ascertained in an unbiased fashion?”  African-Americans and European-Americans were compared.  The conclusion: “...most of the common SNPs in this data set are either private or common in only a single population.”  Haplotype analysis gave similar results.  More to the point, even many of those SNPs common to both groups had markedly different frequencies (i.e., their frequencies were population distinctive).  And these were derived from functional DNA sequences, relevant because Salter stresses functional genes in his work.  However, the functional/non-functional divide doesn’t really alter anything, since this paper also states that “...ancestry inferences are robust using a modest number of polymorphisms in either coding or non-coding regions.” 

Second, since Salter is indeed concerned with functional genes (see point 4), it does make sense to examine gene/allele frequency.  David’s complaint about “function and fitness” is somewhat contradictory since he then suggests that total genomic similarity be considered, which is not really concerned with “function and fitness”.

Third, the main body of point 2 is essentially just a restatement of point 1, and can be answered the same as above for point 1.

Fourth, the argument against the importance of general “genetic similarity” is even more fundamental. Just as natural selection is dependent upon genetic variation and works upon genetic differences, by analogy, so do relative differences in genetic interests depend on distinctive gene frequencies.  Thus, genetic interests are not concerned with absolute levels of genetic similarity.  Mice share ~ 90% of their gene sequences with humans, but this does not mean that two (or more) mice constitute a greater genetic interest for you than does one other single human.

Salter clearly states in his book (page 95) that it is only distinctive genes [frequencies] that are important (not total genetic similarity).  Harpending also makes this point in his onion analogy in the Appendix (page 327).  Genetic variation that is randomly distributed among populations does not constitute ethnic genetic interest because the gene (and gene sequence) frequencies remain the same regardless of the outcome of ethnic competition.  

Thus, it is not overall genetic similarity that is the point per se, but distinctive genetic information, in a relative sense.  Salter (page 47) illustrates the relative nature of genetic interests with his “a world made up of cousins” analogy.

The bulk of human genetic variation is within populations, randomly distributed among the groups; in fact, as Sarich and Miele state in their book “Race”, because humans are diploid a significant fraction of human genetic variation is found within each individual person.  

Genetic information that does not differ in frequency between groups is not the stuff upon which inter-group competition and genetic interests are built.  For most but not all (!) of the human genome it would not matter if all humans except for Bushmen were killed, because the genetic variation in Bushmen is at least as great as that of any other human population and composes the bulk of total human genetic variation.  However, for those distinctive gene sequences, for which there is considerable inter-group variability, much would indeed be lost if specific populations are diminished or eliminated.  Members of groups thus have interests (ethnic genetic interests) in the frequencies of those distinctive genes/gene sequences, which is what in fact distinguishes one human group from another at the genetic level.  Furthermore, those gene frequencies that result in the phenotypic differences between population groups are concentrated in the genetic variation between groups.  Therefore, not only is this lesser level of variation more valuable because of its uniqueness and distinctiveness but also because of its functional information. 

This is why it is not important that an Irishman may theoretically share more similarity in his overall genome to a Nigerian than to another Irishman, for that similarity is based upon randomly distributed genetic variation that, because it is ubiquitous, has no value as a genetic interest.  However, the Irishman in question will in fact share more similarity with another Irishman than with a Nigerian for that genetic information that is not randomly distributed, but distinctive.

This is also why it would be more adaptive for an Irishman to support his fellow Irishman in competition with a Nigerian who may be more similar to the Irishman in the entire genome.  The bulk of the similarity between the Irishman and the Nigerian is based upon gene sequences randomly distributed among all humans and thus this similarity does not constitute meaningful information in distinguishing intra-human genetic interests; e.g., between those of Irishmen and Nigerians.

If all Nigerians became extinct, this would not change the worldwide frequencies of this randomly distributed genetic information.  It will still be found in similar proportions in all other populations, and thus the Irishman would lose no genetic interest.  However, if all Irishmen except for our Irish person of interest became extinct, then there would be a diminishment in unique and distinctive genetic information, and therefore a significant loss of genetic interest for our subject.  An incorrect emphasis on absolute numbers of similar gene sequences, rather on the relative nature of distinctive genetic information, would result in the absurd conclusion that a person has a greater genetic interest in a vegetable garden (or any other organic mass containing a large number of similar [potentially] replicating gene sequences) than in their own child.  Selection, competition, and conflicting biological interests are based upon distinctions in genetic information, not upon randomly distributed genetic similarity, genetic information that retains the same representation in the population regardless of outcome. (See also Salter’s book, pages 45-48, 95, and 327-333).

OK, on to points 3 and 5.  Here we observe a serious problem in which Salter’s views are being grossly misrepresented, and clearly written statements in his book are being completely ignored.  Salter’s views are not “anti-eugenic”, and the Huntington’s example is vulgar and absurd.  Salter openly and clearly states (Section 4d, page 89) that it would be adaptive, in a net sense for the entire distinctive genome, for maladaptive alleles to be sacrificed. Salter also makes a similar point about possible adaptive changes in genetic structure in section 4g, page 109, in which he states that specific positive genetic characteristics could be spread throughout a population via “inter-marriage or reproductive technologies”.  Salter also makes the point in his ethics section (page 319) that genetic competition must be allowed to continue, but within limits - total displacement, or severe diminishment, of ethnies is to be avoided. Salter approvingly discusses Hamilton’s point that “social systems must leave room for adaptive genetic replacement”.  However, Salter stresses, again, that ethnic displacement is wrong, and that adaptive changes in gene frequencies can take place without such displacement.  Indeed, for most of human history, selective pressures have been acting on isolated, relatively homogenous populations.  Eugenics can be practiced within the ethny, and, yes, without the “intermarriage” that Salter mentions, and it is completely compatible with a strong commitment to ethnic genetic interests.

Eugenic modulation within the ethny is best, since it preserves kinship genetic interests while boosting adaptive genetic interests.  Intermarriage between widely separated groups would destroy genetic interest to a far greater extent than any putative increase in a positively valued trait, as my IQ example illustrates.

In summary, I see points 3 and 5 as gross distortions of Salter’s openly stated views. Essentially David lifts from Salter’s book the possible objections, but neglects to give Salter’s answers.  These distortions are a plain warning sign to third parties NOT to depend on GNXP for honest analyses of Salterism.

With regard to point 4 please see my answers to 3 and 5 above.  Also, please bear in mind that this criticism is again a gross distortion of Salter, who makes clear again and again that he is talking about functional genes: e.g., he mentions the importance of this on pages 87-88; on page 88 he clearly states that he has relegated non-functional DNA sequences to “non-interest status”.

Actually the distinction between functional and non-functional genes is, I think, going to be worn down over time, given increasing evidence that “non-functional” genes actually do have regulatory functions.  Furthermore, I argue that even some real non-functional genes constitute part of genetic interests, because they can embody distinctive genetic information.  Functional genes may constitute both kinship genetic interests and adaptive genetic interests, while non-functional genes may constitute kinship genetic interests only.  On a per codon basis, the functional genes are of course, a greater interest but the non-functional genes are an interest as well.  While Deutsch, like Salter, stresses the importance of functional genes, he admits (pages 173-174 in “Fabric of Reality”) that this is a matter of degree.  The information of functional genes fills their “niche” better than non-functional genes, since the functional genes actively contribute to their own replication.  But, non-functional genes carry information as well, even if it is of lesser value.  For example, I suggest that DNA sequences relevant to kinship (e.g., ancestral markers) are a form of information and if information is fundamental to reality (with genetic information being fundamental to life), then it has value.

My assertion that true non-functional genes can constitute genetic interest does not obviate the points made in response to point 2 regarding Salter’s stress on functional genes in his analysis of genetic interest. The key here is information - distinctive genetic information. Deutsch stresses that genes embody knowledge; e.g., he states that life “is about the physical embodiment of knowledge” (page 181 of Fabric of Reality).  Functional genes (including so-called “non-functional” genes that have real regulatory roles) embody knowledge of their niches and contribute to their own replication in a real way.  Certain true non-functional genes embody knowledge of kinship between living organisms, and these distinctive non-functional gene markers can be considered analogous to the gene alleles discussed in point 2.

I cannot ignore the fact that that a portion of the non-functional genome that is distinctive contains information.  I see information as being fundamental.  After all, there is a choice - there can be non-functional sequences “A” or non-functional sequences “B”.  Those that are randomly shared between all groups are not interests between humans, since they give no information.  Those ancestral markers that distinguish ethnies represent information, and thus, I argue, represent interest (since there is competition for which of these distinctive gene sequences will be represented in the next generation).

Do please note that these thoughts on the importance of (true) non-functional genes are my own.  Salter - contrary to David’s implication - focuses on functional genes.  Furthermore, the historical development of the gene frequency differences that Salter is concerned with is not relevant to current consideration of genetic interests.  The main question with respect to genetic interest is “what”, not “why.”  Thus, whether selection or drift (or any other mechanism) is responsible for observed gene frequencies does not change the interests in question.

As a side note, I’d suggest that in any future update of “On Genetic Interests” Dr. Salter should not only clarify these points further, but should also add sections on:

-      Genetic patterns/combinations as genetic interests

-      Compare and contrast kinship genetic interests and adaptive genetic interests

-      Intrinsic value of genetic information; compare and contrast roles of functional and non-functional genes

-      Do dominant alleles have greater influence (positive or negative) on genetic interests than do recessive alleles?

-      Discussion on how ethnic and meta-ethnic identities can boost adaptive behavior with respect to genetic interests even in light of potential kinship overlap between closely related groups

Part III: Intermarriage Fallacy David presents a two-group (English-Bantu) population model to demonstrate that the proportions of distinctive genes remain the same after intermarriage.  He also asserts that the loss of kinship on one side of the intermarriage divide is counterbalanced by an equal loss on the other side; given the relative nature of genetic interests, intermarriage would thus result in no loss of genetic interest.  Discuss.

Putting aside for the moment questions about patterns of gene frequencies (below), David’s analysis does not take into proper consideration the following two essential factors:

1) The fixed carrying capacity of each nation (an integral part of Salter’s thesis discussed, for example, on pages 61-63 of his book), and

2) The effects of unidirectional migration.

So, for #1 we can talk about the number of “English gene equivalents” in an English population at any given time.  However, England has a fixed carrying capacity.  Let us say for example it is 150 million.  Whether those 150 million are of pure English stock or of mixed English-Bantu stock makes an enormous difference to the genetic interests of the current English population and to each individual Englishman.  Population cannot increase infinitely.  If the 150 million people are “pure” English (and of course diploid), then that’s 300 million sets of “English” genes (300M/2 = 150M).  If the 150 million are English-Bantu hybrids, then there are 150M “English” genes and 150M “Bantu” genes.  If we say that the carrying capacity is 300 million, or 1 billion, or any number short of infinity, the same holds.

As regards #2 there is one-way gene flow from non-white nations to England.  So, it is NOT the case that a miscegenating Englishman is boosting his fitness by “preventing” the births of pure Bantus in a reciprocal fashion.  In Africa, pure Bantus are still being born without the threat of immigration and genetic dilution, and these will fill the carrying capacity of their territory in sub-Saharan Africa.  Meanwhile, there is unidirectional migration of Africans to the UK, where they dilute the genetic interests of the native English ethny.  Intermarriage in the UK may prevent the birth of pure Bantus in the UK, but the presence of Bantus in the UK represents an excess of Bantu genetic interests above and beyond the store of undiluted genetic interests in their homeland.  In other words - and this is crucial - intermarriage in the UK represents a positive net expansion of Bantu genes.  They are not being prevented from producing pure Bantus - they have every opportunity to pursue a national ethnic strategy in Africa.  The people who are really being prevented from producing “pure offspring” are the English, for it is their territory that is being invaded.

Since the flow of people (and genes) is not reciprocal, then the effects of intermarriage are not reciprocal. It is the native ethny of the mixed state who are being prevented from maintaining their representation of the world-wide population.  The alien ethny both maintains their representation in their homelands and expands their genes in someone else’s territory.  Ultimately, the Bantu genes are, on a world-wide basis, expanding, while those of the English are declining.  How on earth is there any reciprocity in that?

As regards the interests of an individual Englishman, the same holds.  By intermarriage, he loses parental kinship compared to endogamy, and he also loses relative genetic interest not only compared to endogamous co-ethnics and non-ethnics but also to exogamous non-ethnics, because of the asymmetrical nature of gene flow as described above.

Let us use another simple model of population and immigration to summarize these points. Take two populations A and B who live in their respective nations AX and BX.  Let us assume that AX and BX both have a carrying capacity of “12 genetic-population units”.  We start with the condition that AX has 4 A units and BX has 8 B units.  Two B units migrate from BX to AX; typical unidirectional migration.  Both nations now have 6 population units; BX is “pure” 6 B, while AX is 4A and 2 B.  Let us assume no further immigration, and that in AX both ethnies have ~ equal growth rates (a very conservative assumption).  Both nations then reach carrying capacity.  BX will have 12 B units.  Given proportional growth, AX will have 8 A and 4 B units.

Obviously, this unidirectional migration has harmed A’s interests, in that they have suffered a decline in their population compared to what it would have been (12A) without the migration of B.  The worldwide genetic representation of A has been diminished, while B has benefited by increasing its genetic representation over and beyond the capacity of BX alone, from 12B to 16B.

According to classical Salterism, the damage to A will be the same, in a strictly genetic basis, regardless of whether the two groups in AX had remained endogamous after the B migration event, or whether there was intermarriage.  The same number of individual “genetic units” from each group would be present.  However:

1) An interest in patterns/combinations of genes and gene frequencies yields a gross decrease in fitness comparing exogamy over endogamy.  On a worldwide basis, A suffers more than B, because B is still present in undiluted form in BX.

2) Even given classical Salterism, exogamy hurts A’s interests by decreasing the organic solidarity of the A group.  Imagine that endogamy was maintained.  Group A could rally around a historical A identity and pursue group interests vs. B.  They could promote repatriation of B, separation, or some other political-social movement to attempt to restore/maximize A’s interests over that of the B newcomers.  They could attempt to out-breed (e.g., going against the assumption above), maximizing A gene frequencies.

But once admixture occurs, a heavily hybridized population cannot extricate A interests away from that of B.  Families would be mixed, genomes would be mixed, and whatever pure A’s remain would have a limited potential to recruit sufficient numbers of other pure A’s to their side in the struggle against B interests.  Some pure A’s would have admixed family members, etc.  Given sufficient intermarriage, the interests of the two groups would become so intertwined that it would be impossible for the original interests of group A to be pursued.

Thus, even with classical Salterian theory, endogamy is to be preferred because it allows the native ethny to strategize on a group-centered basis to salvage genetic interests. Group B, secure in their original homeland, can afford to dilute A’s interests and group solidarity via intermarriage.  The effects - genetic and socio-political - of intermarriage are not reciprocal because the migration is not reciprocal.  This holds regardless of whether the migration was voluntary (immigration) or involuntary (slave trade).

David B is also a bit inconsistent about all of this.  Salter considers intermarriage from both the familial and ethnic dimension.  If we focus on the family, it is clear that endogamy is superior, in that it boosts relative parental kinship.  But ah! … We are told by David that we must also consider the effects of mate choice on others.  Very well.  Why stop at the “spare English woman” or the local Bantu immigrant “prevented” from producing pure Bantu offspring?  If we need to consider the effects on others, in the context of ethnic genetic interests, then we need to consider effects on the entire ethnies, no?  And given realities of unidirectional immigration, the effects on others of intermarriage is always to lower the fitness of the net receiving ethny and to boost that of the net “contributing” immigrant ethny.

You can’t have it both ways, indeed!  If you wish to consider “effects on others” you cannot arbitrarily stop the analysis at the point that is convenient for your argument.  You must consider the proportional representation of ethnic genes and gene frequencies both within the entire nation and within the world-wide human population, and you must consider the time dimension as well – “effects on others” include future generations (who will be faced with a maxed-out carrying capacity) as well as the current one.  After all, consideration of the genetic relationship between generations is what the intermarriage/genetic interests idea is all about.

To summarize the classical Salterian view:-

Regardless of intermarriage, the mere presence of alien peoples (e.g., immigrants and their descendants) harms the genetic interests of every member of the native ethny.  If some natives out-marry with the aliens, they also suffer a loss of parental kinship with their offspring relative to what they would have obtained with endogamy and they also lose genetic interest relative to those co-ethnics who do not out-marry.  Alien ethnics who out-marry, of course, also lose relative genetic interest compared to their endogamous co-ethnics. However, even the out-marrying alien ethnics gain a genetic advantage over all of the native ethnics, because of the asymmetrical nature of unidirectional immigration flow.  Even though they lose relative genetic interest compared to endogamous alien co-ethnics, they “help” displace native genes and gene frequencies while their own homelands maintain a reservoir of undiluted ethnic interests. 

Thus, for the native ethnics, “diversity” is always a net loss of genetic interests, with exogamous natives losing more than endogamous ones.  For the aliens, it is a net gain as they are expanding their genes and gene frequencies into someone else’s territory (assuming that the flow is not reciprocal, which it never is).  Out-marrying aliens gain less than endogamous aliens, but all gain

relative to the natives.

The end result of all of these demographic shifts is a net loss of native genes and gene frequencies and a net gain for the aliens.  Out-marrying also constitutes a dilution of the genetic interests that every member of an ethny has in the other.  This not only decreases co-ethnic genetic interest (one can consider out-marriage as decreasing the genetic interests of other co-ethnics) but it undermines the organic solidarity of the group, making the pursuit of group interests less feasible.  Thus, the ability of the group to compete is decreased relative to other groups.  People who out-marry genetically distant others can be viewed as “free riders” on their group’s continuity.  They benefit from the existence of their group, but “contribute” negatively to it.  All this undermines the group’s position in global competition.

But classical Salterian theory is limited. Of course, there is a real Salterian “fallacy” - but one that underestimates, not overestimates, the genetic loss via intermarriage and that undercuts the critique analyzed here.  Thus, patterns of gene frequencies is a piece of information destroyed by intermarriage independent of the number of specific alleles in the general population.